Scalar sextet in the 331 model with right-handed neutrinos

A Higgs sextet is introduced in order to generate Dirac and Majorana neutrino masses in the 331 model with right-handed neutrinos. As will be seen, the present sextet introduction leads to a rich neutrino mass structure. The smallness of neutrino masses can be achieved via, for example, a seesaw limit. The fact that the masses of the charged leptons are not effected by their new Yukawa couplings to the sextet is convenient for generating small neutrino masses.Comment: RevTeX4, 5 pages, no figure. To appear in Phys. Rev. D. Misprints removed (v.2

One mandarin benefits the whole clan: hometown favoritism in an authoritarian regime

We study patronage politics in authoritarian Vietnam, using an exhaustive panel of 603 ranking officials from 2000 to 2010 to estimate their promotions’ impact on infrastructure in their hometowns of patrilineal ancestry. Native officials’ promotions lead to a broad range of hometown infrastructure improvement. Hometown favoritism is pervasive across all ranks, even among officials without budget authority, except among elected legislators. Favors are narrowly targeted towards small communes that have no political power, and are strengthened with bad local governance and strong local family values. The evidence suggests a likely motive of social preferences for hometown

Irreducible representations of Upq[gl(2/2)]

The two-parametric quantum superalgebra $U_{pq}[gl(2/2)]$ and its representations are considered. All finite-dimensional irreducible representations of this quantum superalgebra can be constructed and classified into typical and nontypical ones according to a proposition proved in the present paper. This proposition is a nontrivial deformation from the one for the classical superalgebra gl(2/2), unlike the case of one-parametric deformations.Comment: Latex, 8 pages. A reference added in v.

One Mandarin benefits the whole clan: hometown favoritism in an authoritarian regime

We study patronage politics in authoritarian Vietnam, using an exhaustive panel of ranking officials from 2000 to 2010 to estimate their promotions’ impact on infrastructure in their hometowns of patrilineal ancestry. Native officials’ promotions lead to a broad range of hometown infrastructure improvement. Hometown favoritism is pervasive across all ranks, even among officials without budget authority, except among elected legislators. Favors are narrowly targeted toward small communes that have no political power, and are strengthened with bad local governance and strong local family values. The evidence suggests a likely motive of social preferences for hometown